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A CRITICISM OF THE ARTICLE “AN EXPERIMENTAL
TEST OF NON-LOCAL REALISM”
DANIEL V. TAUSK
Abstract. I make some critical comments on the article [11]. This
article makes incorrect claims concerning Bell’s theorem [1]. Moreover,
I point to the fact that a hypothesis referred to as “realism” in [11] is
not used in the deduction of Leggett’s inequality.
“It is the requirement of locality, or more pre-
cisely that the result of a measurement on one sys-
tem be unaffected by operations on a distant system
with which it has interacted in the past, that creates
the essential difficulty.”
John Bell in [1, Introduction].
There is hardly a result that is more widely misunderstood in the scien-
tific community than Bell’s theorem. In a nutshell, there is a widespread
belief that in his celebrated article [1], Bell has shown that the assump-
tion of locality, when taken together with an assumption of the existence
of hidden variables, allows one to deduce a certain inequality (now known
as Bell’s inequality) that contradicts quantum mechanical predictions. A
crucial point that is usually overlooked is the fact that the existence of the
hidden variables used in the deduction of Bell’s inequality is inferred from
the assumption of locality using the EPR argument; it is not, as many physi-
cists seem to think, an additional assumption that is necessary for proving
the inequality. Therefore, violation of Bell’s inequality implies that locality
has to be abandoned.
The misunderstanding regarding the meaning of Bell’s theorem seems to
be widespread, but fortunately not universal. Indeed, attempts to clear up
the confusion have been made by many authors (see, for instance, [6, pgs.
10—15], [10], [12], [14]), most notably Bell himself. For instance, in footnote
number 10 of [3], Bell wrote1:
Date: September 7th, 2008.
1Bell explains his violation of locality argument in several of his writings (see [5] for
the collection of Bell’s articles on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics). In fact, one
version of the argument goes directly from locality to an inequality that is violated by the
quantum predictions (the Clauser–Holt–Shimony–Horne inequality) and it does not even
have to mention any sort of hidden variables (see, for instance, [2] and [3, Section 4]). See
also [4] for the (in my opinion) best of Bell’s articles on the subject.
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“[. . . ] My own first paper on this subject (Physics 1, 195 (1965).) starts
with a summary of the EPR argument from locality to deterministic hidden
variables. But the commentators have almost universally reported that it
begins with deterministic hidden variables.” (emphasis in the original)
The above noted misconception regarding the hypotheses necessary for
the deduction of Bell’s inequality is not the only one; in addition, one en-
counters the now apparently popular habit of replacing the expression “hid-
den variables” with the word “realism”. This often leads to a confusion
between the notion of “hidden variable” (usually understood as any param-
eter that represents more information about a given system than the wave
function) with the several different possible meanings2 that can be given to
the word “realism” in the Philosophy of Science (or Philosophy in general).
For instance, right at the beginning of paper [11], in the abstract, we find
the following statement:
“Most working scientists hold fast to the concept of ‘realism’ — a view-
point according to which an external reality exists independent of observa-
tion. But quantum physics has shattered some of our cornerstone beliefs.
According to Bell’s theorem, any theory that is based on the joint assump-
tion of realism and locality (meaning that local events cannot be affected by
actions in spacelike separated regions) is at variance with certain quantum
predictions.”
So, the “realism” that appears in the abstract of [11] seems to be some sort
of philosophical notion of realism (as we will see below, a different notion of
“realism” is considered within the article). In fact, the citation above looks
like a suggestion that working scientists should take solipsism seriously, or
at least that they should consider the possibility that tables, mountains and
planets do not exist at all in the absence of a conscious observer of some
sort. There is no rational justification for such a radically counter-intuitive
statement.
A rather extreme type of misunderstanding concerning Bell’s theorem is
shown in the following passage from [11, pg. 871]:
“The logical conclusion one can draw from the violation of local realism is
that at least one of its assumptions fails. Specifically, either locality or real-
ism or both cannot provide a foundational basis for quantum theory. Each
of the resulting possible positions has strong supporters and opponents in
the scientific community. However, Bell’s theorem is unbiased with respect
2See [15] for a nice discussion of some possible meanings of the word “realism” and
for more detailed criticism on the bad habit of saying that Bell has shown that we have
to abandon “local realism”. For a nice discussion about the distinction between a realist
and an instrumentalist interpretation of a given physical theory, see [7]. There is indeed
a relation between the notion of “hidden variable” and some notions of “realism”, but
confusion often arises when one takes their meanings to be identical or when one simply
does not care to assign any precise meanings to those words at all.
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to these views: on the basis of this theorem, one cannot, even in principle,
favour one over the other. It is therefore important to ask whether incom-
patibility theorems similar to Bell’s can be found in which at least one of
these concepts is relaxed.” (emphasis added)
In this passage, the authors of [11] give the impression that they think that
the choice between abandoning locality or abandoning realism (whatever
that turns out to mean) is a matter of subjective personal taste: some
members of the scientific community prefer to abandon locality and others
prefer to abandon realism. The statement that Bell’s theorem is “unbiased”
reveals a great deal of misunderstanding regarding the hypotheses involved
in its proof.
Let us now turn to the analysis of the hypotheses that the authors of [11]
claim to be using in the proof of Leggett’s inequality ([11, pg. 872]):
“[. . . ] The theories are based on the following assumptions: (1) all mea-
surement outcomes are determined by pre-existing properties of particles in-
dependent of the measurement (realism); (2) physical states are statistical
mixtures of subensembles with definite polarization, where (3) polarization is
defined such that expectation values taken for each subensemble obey Malus’
law (that is, the well-known cosine dependence of the intensity of a polarized
beam after an ideal polarizer).”
The notion of “realism” expressed in hypothesis (1) is different from the
one considered in the paper’s abstract; here “realism” doesn’t seem to be
taken as the opposite of solipsism or of some other radical form of philosoph-
ical idealism. It is not completely clear, though, what hypothesis (1) means.
Below I will present a brief analysis of some possible meanings for hypothesis
(1), but let me emphasize that my main point here is that hypothesis (1) is
simply not used in the deduction of Leggett’s inequality. It is a bit odd, to
say the least, that an article that claims to be doing “an experimental test
of non-local realism” is apparently trying to accomplish its goal by verifying
the violation of an inequality whose proof does not use the very hypothesis
that the authors call “realism”! A more appropriate title would be “An
experimental test of Leggett’s subensembles hypothesis”, which is precisely
what the article presents.
Let us discuss some possible meanings for hypothesis (1). What exactly is
supposed to determine the outcome of an experiment? One possible answer
is: the outcome of an experiment is assumed to be completely determined by
a complete description of the system of particles being observed and by the
self-adjoint operator that would normally be used to compute the probabil-
ity distribution on the set of possible outcomes for the experiment. I’ll call
such a hypothesis operator realism. The problem with operator realism is
that it is already well-known that it is inconsistent with quantum mechani-
cal predictions: all those results that are usually called “no hidden variables
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theorems” prove precisely that3. Thus, it wouldn’t make much sense to take
hypothesis (1) as being operator realism. An alternative meaning to hy-
pothesis (1) is the following: the outcome of an experiment is assumed to be
completely determined by a complete description of the system of particles
being observed and by a sufficiently complete description of the experimental
apparatus4. For the purposes of the present discussion, I’ll call such a hy-
pothesis determinism. It is very important to understand that determinism
is very different from operator realism. Indeed, determinism is consistent
with all quantum mechanical predictions: this is proven by the existence of
Bohmian Mechanics, which is a completely deterministic theory that agrees
with all quantum mechanical predictions5. Therefore, any attempt to prove
incompatibility between determinism and quantum mechanical predictions
is completely pointless. It does make sense, however, to try to prove that
determinism plus some additional hypotheses leads to some inequality that
contradicts quantum mechanical predictions. Unfortunately, as it will be
explained below, that is not what is done in [11]: hypothesis (1) (be it de-
terminism or something else) is not used at all in the proof of Leggett’s
inequality.
I will now present a derivation of Leggett’s inequality from hypotheses (2)
and (3) of [11] alone. As usual, the experimenters will be called Alice and
Bob. Let A (resp., B) denote the result of Alice’s (resp., Bob’s) experiment,
which can be either 1 or −1, and a (resp., b) denote the setting of Alice’s
(resp., Bob’s) experimental apparatus, which is an element of the unit sphere
S2. Hypotheses (2) and (3) amount to a “hidden variables” assumption,
namely, that vectors u,v ∈ S2 are associated to each run of the experiment
(in addition to the usual quantum state vector). A precise mathematical
statement of (2) and (3) can be formulated as follows:
(•) for every a,b ∈ S2, there exists a probability distribution Pab on
{−1, 1} × {−1, 1} × S2 × S2 representing the joint distribution of
(A,B,u,v) when the experiment is done with settings a and b.
These distributions are such that the (marginal) distribution Puv of
3See, for instance, [6, pgs. 6—10] and [13]. A notable exception is the “no hidden
variables theorem” due to von Neumann, which does not even allow the rejection of
operator realism, since (in addition to operator realism) it assumes a hypothesis that is
not justifiable solely on the basis of quantum mechanical predictions. See [13] for details.
4In the case of experiments with entangled particles located far away from each other,
the “sufficiently complete description of the experimental apparatus” may include a de-
scription of parts of the experimental apparatus that are located far away from each other.
5See [8, 16]. Bohmian Mechanics is a formalism that is obtained from the standard
quantum formalism by adding well-defined particle trajectories satisfying a simple first
order ordinary differential equation involving the wave function. The addition of particle
trajectories turns quantum mechanics into a precisely formulated physical theory, with
a well-defined ontology. The privileged role played by “measurement” or “observers” in
standard quantum mechanics simply disappears; in particular, Bohmian Mechanics solves
the so called “measurement problem”. Bohmian Mechanics is obviously incompatible with
operator realism (see [9]).
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(u,v) does not depend on (a,b), and the conditional expectations
Eab(A | u,v) and Eab(B | u,v) are given by:
(∗) Eab(A | u,v) = u · a, Eab(B | u,v) = v · b.
Here is how (•) leads to Leggett’s inequality: equality (5) in [11], namely:
−1 + |A+B| = AB = 1− |A−B|,
is simply a consequence of the fact that A and B take values on {−1, 1}.
Taking expectations conditioned on (u,v) and using the fact that the modu-
lus of the expectation is less than or equal to the expectation of the modulus,
we get:
− 1 +
∣∣Eab(A | u,v) +Eab(B | u,v)∣∣ ≤ Eab(AB | u,v)
≤ 1−
∣∣Eab(A | u,v) − Eab(B | u,v)∣∣,
which is the same as inequality (8) in [11]. We now use (∗) and take expec-
tations on both sides (with fixed (a,b)), obtaining:
− 1 +
∫
S2×S2
|u0 · a+ v0 · b| dPuv(u0,v0) ≤ Eab(AB)
≤ 1−
∫
S2×S2
|u0 · a− v0 · b| dPuv(u0,v0).
The rest of the proof of Leggett’s inequality involves only mathematical
manipulations of the inequalities above and makes no further use of physical
hypotheses of any kind.
To summarize, what can one conclude from the violation of Leggett’s
inequality? The logical conclusion is that Leggett’s subensembles hypothesis
(•) is false, i.e., that a theory that contains the hidden variables u and
v proposed by Leggett cannot be empirically viable. That doesn’t tell us
anything about determinism or any type of philosophical realism. A title like
“An experimental test of non-local realism” is severely misleading: it could,
for instance, lead some readers into believing that the experiment reported
by the article makes a theory like Bohmian Mechanics more implausible6,
while it is exactly the other way around: a prediction of Bohmian Mechanics
has been experimentally verified and a class of alternatives to it has been
shown not to be viable.
6It should be observed, however, that the authors of [11] are careful enough to point out
in their article that Bohmian Mechanics falls outside the class of theories that is falsified
by their experiment. On the other hand, the authors do not present any arguments
against Bohmian Mechanics itself and I’m very puzzled about why the authors make wild
speculations about the violation of things like Aristotelian logic in the last paragraph of
the article.
A CRITICISM OF “AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF NON-LOCAL REALISM” 6
References
[1] J. S. Bell, On the Einstein–Podolski–Rosen paradox, Physics 1, pgs. 195—200 (1964),
republished in [5].
[2] J. S. Bell, Atomic-cascade photons and quantum-mechanical nonlocality, Comments
on Atomic and Molecular Physics 9, pgs. 121—126 (1980), republished in [5].
[3] J. S. Bell, Bertlmann’s socks and the nature of reality, Journal de Physique, Colloque
C2, suppl. au numero 3, Tome 42, pgs. C2 41—61 (1981), republished in [5].
[4] J. S. Bell, La nouvelle cuisine, Between Science and Technology, edited by A. Sar-
lemijn and P. Kroes, Elsevier Science Publishers (1990), republished in [5].
[5] J. S. Bell, Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics, Cambridge University
Press, 2nd ed. (2004).
[6] J. Bricmont, What is the meaning of the wave function?, Fundamental interactions:
from symmetries to blackholes, pgs. 53—67, edited by J.-M. Fre`re, M. Henneaux, A.
Sevrin, Ph. Spindel (1999).
[7] J. Bricmont & A. Sokal, Defense of a modest scientific realism, Knowledge and the
World: Challenges Beyond the Science Wars, edited by Martin Carrier, Johannes
Roggenhofer, Gu¨nter Ku¨ppers and Philippe Blanchard, Springer–Verlag, pgs. 17—45
(2004).
[8] D. Du¨rr, S. Goldstein & N. Zangh`ı, Quantum Equilibrium and the Origin of Absolute
Uncertainty, Journal of Statistical Physics 67, pgs. 843—907 (1992).
[9] D. Du¨rr, M. Daumer, S. Goldstein & N. Zangh`ı, Naive Realism about Operators,
Erkenntnis 45, pgs. 379—397 (1996).
[10] D. Du¨rr, S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka, & N. Zangh`ı, John Bell and Bell’s Theorem,
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Second Edition, edited by D. M. Borchert (Macmillan
Reference, 2006).
[11] S. Gro¨blacher, T. Paterek, R. Kaltenbaek, Cˇ. Brukner, M. Z˙ukowski, M. Aspelmeyer,
& A. Zeilinger, An experimental test of non-local realism, Nature 446, pgs. 871—875
(2007).
[12] T. Maudlin, Quantum Non-Locality and Relativity, Blackwell, Cambridge (1994).
[13] N. D. Mermin, Hidden variables and the two theorems of John Bell, Rev. Mod. Phys.
65, pgs. 803—815 (1993).
[14] T. Norsen, Bell locality and the nonlocal character of Nature, Foundations of Physics
Letters, 19 (7), pgs. 633—655 (2006).
[15] T. Norsen, Against ‘realism’, Foundations of Physics, vol. 37, n. 3, pgs. 311—340
(2007).
[16] R. Tumulka, Understanding Bohmian mechanics: A dialogue, American Journal of
Physics 72 (9), pgs. 1220—1226 (2004).
Departamento de Matema´tica,
Universidade de Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil
E-mail address: tausk@ime.usp.br
URL: http://www.ime.usp.br/~tausk
